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Primary health care  
funding models 
The way primary health care (PHC) services are funded ultimately impacts on the 
quality, access and coordination of health service delivery. Financial mechanisms have 
long been used to influence provider behaviour, for example to increase productivity, 
control costs and improve efficiency.1 Health system administrators are charged with 
the task of meeting growing demand for services with finite resources, emphasising 
quality and placing a financial value on it. 
This RESEARCH ROUNDup examines the funding models that impact on PHC service 
delivery. 
of the work can be delegated to other allied health workers or 
nurses, and can be coordinated through incentives such as 
Chronic Disease Management Items (CDM) care plans which 
involve the community health sector in a partnership approach 
to care. Service Incentive Payments (SIP)6, CDM payments and 
other specific payments are based on type/number of services 
provided of a specific standard, paid through the MBS to 
individual GPs. One current investigation of alternate funding 
models is the Diabetes Care Project,7 replacing care-planning 
MBS items with diabetes-related PIP payments. Evaluation not 
currently available. 
Although payment systems may be used to achieve policy 
objectives (eg. cost containment or improved quality of care), 
little is known about the effects of different payment systems in 
achieving these objectives. It has been proposed that financial 
incentives may be effective in changing health professional 
practice8 thus there are several systematic reviews exploring 
methods of physician payment and clinical behaviours.9 A review 
of managing primary care behaviour through payment systems 
and financial incentives for the European Observatory on Health 
Systems reported that of all payment systems, capitation 
encouraged primary care physicians (PCPs) to provide preventive 
services. This approach reduces future costs, and as PCPs have 
fixed patient lists they are theoretically in an excellent position to 
provide services targeted towards the population.10 However, 
while the use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for 
improving services is growing, there is insufficient evidence to 
support, or not support, the use of financial incentives to 
improve the quality of PHC.11 
International approaches 
Recently there has been an international focus on system-level 
approaches to funding. For instance, shared savings approaches 
are used by Accountable Care Organizations in the United States. 
Providers receive all of their usual FFS payments; however, they 
also receive bonus payments if their efforts to improve care 
through better care coordination and other delivery reforms 
translate into both slower risk-adjusted health spending growth 
and improved performance on quality measures for their 
patients.12 In Germany a similar approach “The Kinzigtal-way”13 
aligns payment with value rather than volume. In this approach 
measurement of health outcomes is central to further 
investment and payers and providers are aligned to the most 
cost-effective interventions. Furthermore, incentives for the 
delivery of holistic care span health and social care.  
Funding health care in Australia 
Australia's health system is funded and administered by several 
levels of government (national, state/territory and local) and is 
supported by private health insurance. Medicare, Australia’s 
national public health insurance scheme, is funded and 
administered by the Federal Government and consists of three 
health care components: medical services (including visits to 
general practitioners (GPs) and other medical practitioners) 
through the Medical Benefits Scheme (MBS); prescription 
pharmaceuticals through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
(PBS); and hospital treatment as a public patient (the latter is 
jointly funded by the Federal and state/territory governments).2 
The Federal and state/territory governments also fund and 
deliver PHC, population health programs, community health 
services, health and medical research, Indigenous health, mental 
health, health workforce and health infrastructure. 
Funding models 
There has been growing interest in payment models to influence 
PHC service delivery (Table 1). Broadly, funding models for PHC 
fall into two categories: population-based funding and patient-
focused funding. Population-based approaches, as their name 
suggests, are focused at funding needs at the population level 
(eg. capitation payments). This type of funding is a block-funding 
arrangement whereby funds are allocated to service providers in 
a lump sum on a periodic basis; and based on the population size 
and the perceived health care needs of the population served. 
These approaches are less well-known in the Australian PHC 
context and more common for hospital funding. Patient-focused 
funding is defined as any method of funding providers that uses 
incentives and supports to improve the appropriateness, quality 
and efficiency of care for patients.1 Pay for performance3-5 (P4P; 
GP paid/penalised for not meeting activity or health outcome 
targets), fee for service (FFS; services are unbundled and paid for 
separately), and activity-based funding (ABF; hospitals are paid 
for an episode of care) are perhaps the most well-known 
examples.  
In Australia, financial incentives are the major funding 
mechanism for bringing about desired changes in practice and 
typically operate at the individual patient level.4 These incentives 
are often incorporated into blended payment systems in General 
Practice, to form a model termed ‘Practice Incentive 
Payments’ (PIP). That is, services must be coordinated by the 
patient’s GP in order for the items to be claimable, though parts 
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Conclusion 
Every funding system brings its own set of desired and perverse 
incentives.14,15 The situation is often worsened when multiple 
funding models are implemented simultaneously and when 
financial incentives between sectors are not aligned (eg. GPs 
paid through FFS whilst hospitals receive ABF: ABF gives 
hospitals an incentive to limit the volume of cases, whilst FFS 
gives GPs incentive to increase volumes).1 Ensuring funding goes 
towards improving patient care rather than simply rewarding 
achievement is the challenge for financing health care across the 
globe. 
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Type Benefits Challenges Examples in Australia 
Fee for Service  
Providers bill for each item of service they 
provide. 
Access to care, greater service 
provision and productivity IF 
patients can afford to pay.1 
Rewards activity rather than quality, may lead 
to shorter visit times, provision of too much or 
fragmented care.16 
Most PHC providers use this via the MBS and 
out-of-pocket expenses to the consumer.  
Fixed Payments per Unit of Time  
Salaries negotiated centrally (eg. between 
provider associations and government), 
with individual-based adjustments to allow 
for experience, location and other 
considerations.  
Allows funders to control PHC costs 
directly.  
May lead to under-provision of services (to ease 
workloads), excessive referrals to secondary 
providers and lack of attention to the 
preferences of patients.  
Inala Primary Care  
Capitated Funding  
Allocation of funding among GPs is 
determined by patient registrations.  
Allows funders to control the overall 
level of PHC expenditures, easier to 
devise in theory than in practice.  
May lead to under-servicing, patient selectivity 
by GPs. Lack of incentive to improve 
performance, efficiency or more appropriate 
use of services; patients viewed as source of 
costs rather than revenue.1  
Confined to NGOs, including Aboriginal 
Community Controlled Health Services, some 
Victorian community health services, and 
other NGOs that employ or contract GPs on a 
sessional basis.4 
Pay-for-Performance 
Payments to individuals (GPs) or 
organisations (practices) based on type/
number of services provided of a specific 
standard/type. Payments to practices 
instead of individuals as compensation for 
risk.  
May improve processes and access 
(quality), provides additional 
payments for tasks that are 
beneficial to patients and not 
otherwise renumerated via existing 
payment mechanisms.  
Rewards activity; context and socioeconomic 
status may affect ability to meet benchmarks.17 
Achieving targeted outcomes but does not 
encourage improvement beyond targeted 
threshold; could be prohibitive to areas with 
low baseline quality thereby discouraging 
participation.  
Service Incentive Payments, chronic disease 
management (CDM) items paid through the 
Medical Benefits Schedule (MBS), Practice 
Incentive Payments (PIP), Practice Nurses 
and Allied Health Professionals (eg. Access to 
Allied Psychology Services).  
Activity-based Funding 
Providers are funded based on expected 
activity, ie. expected costs for clinically-
defined episodes of care.  
Promotes technical efficiency.  Reduced flexibility if funds cannot be moved 
across items; episode-based classification is 
difficult in PHC setting. 
WA implementing ABF for outpatients;18 
mainly hospital-based services. Opportunity 
for gathering information from GP and 
specialist billing codes to develop an episode
-based classification and funding model for 
outpatient care.19 
Acknowledgement: Thank you to expert reviewer  
Guus Schrijvers for his comments on a draft of this paper. 
